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Abstract 
 The discipline of digital forensics requires a combination of skills, qualifications 
and knowledge in the area of forensic investigation, legal aspects and 
information technology. The uniqueness of digital evidence makes the adoption 
of traditional legal approaches problematic.  
Information technology terminology is currently used interchangeably without 
any regard to being unambiguous and consistent in relation to legal texts. Many 
of the information technology terms or concepts have not yet achieved legal 
recognition.  
The recognition and standardisation of terminology within a legal context are of 
the utmost importance to ensure that miscommunication does not occur.  
To provide clarity or guidance on some of the terms and concepts applicable to 
digital forensics and for the search and seizure of digital evidence, some of the 
concepts and terms are reviewed and discussed, using the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 as a point of departure. 
Digital evidence is often collected incorrectly and analysed ineffectively or simply 
overlooked due to the complexities that digital evidence poses to forensic 
investigators. As with any forensic science, specific regulations, guidelines, 
principles or procedures should be followed to meet the objectives of 
investigations and to ensure the accuracy and acceptance of findings. These 
regulations, guidelines, principles or procedures are discussed within the context 
of digital forensics: what processes should be followed and how these processes 
ensure the acceptability of digital evidence. These processes include 
international principles and standards such as those of the Association of Chiefs 
of Police Officers and the International Organisation of Standardisation. A 
summary is also provided of the most influential or best-recognised international 
(IOS) standards on digital forensics.  
It is concluded that the originality, reliability, integrity and admissibility of digital 
evidence should be maintained as follows: 
 Data should not be changed or altered. 
 Original evidence should not be directly examined. 
 Forensically sound duplicates should be created. 
 Digital forensic analyses should be performed by competent persons. 
 Digital forensic analyses should adhere to relevant local legal requirements. 
 Audit trails should exist consisting of all required documents and actions. 
 The chain of custody should be protected. 
 Processes and procedures should be proper, while recognised and accepted 
by the industry.  
If the ACPO (1997) principles and ISO/IEC 27043 and 27037 Standards are 
followed as a forensic framework, then digital forensic investigators should follow 
these standards as a legal framework. 
Keywords 
Digital forensics; digital devices; digital search and seizure; digital evidence; 
forensic investigation; international standards. 
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1 Introduction 
The discipline of digital forensics requires a combination of skills, 
qualifications and knowledge in the area of forensic investigation, legal 
aspects and information technology.1 In many academic papers and court 
cases information technology terminology is used interchangeably without 
any regard to its being unambiguous and conducive to consistent 
interpretation of terminology in a legal context, which is why information 
technology terminology is largely unknown in the legal system.2 Many 
information technology terms or concepts have not yet achieved legal 
recognition. This notion is supported by the South African Law Reform 
Commission (hereafter SALRC),3 which has expressed the opinion that the 
earlier opinion that computers are "just like" filing cabinets does not hold 
true in the light of new technological capabilities. This was also the opinion 
of the Supreme Court in the Canadian case R v Vu.4 
Accurate legal definitions are vital to the operation of legal instruments, 
where words signify concepts in law, and the vocabulary consists of 
technical or legal terms and non-technical terms found in everyday 
language.5 Many of the words used in legal discourse are derived from 
ordinary language, but the true development of legal terminology − to a 
great extent − is derived from legal discourse in courts and depends less on 
the parameters set for communication with regard to generally recognised 
legal science principles.6 The recognition of terminology within a legal 
context is of the utmost importance to ensure that miscommunication does 
not occur. One should bear in mind that an initial understanding of texts may 
not be the only plausible interpretation.7 This can especially be true in a 
digital environment where technical aspects can have an influence on the 
normal interpretation or understanding of terms. Although one acceptable 
                                            
  Jacobus Gerhardus Johannes Nortjé. BCom Hons Business Administration MBA 
MCom Forensic Accounting (NWU) (FP)SA CFE. Associated Professor of Forensic 
Accounting and Forensic Investigation Management, North-West University, South 
Africa. Email: Koos.Nortje@nwu.ac.za. 
  Daniel Christoffel Myburgh. BCom Hons Information Systems MCom Forensic 
Accounting (NWU). MCom Forensic Accounting Student North-West University, South 
Africa. Email: dc@cyanre.co.za. 
1  Kessler Judges' Awareness 1. 
2  Kessler Judges' Awareness 2. 
3  SALRC Issue Paper 27 8. 
4  R v Vu 2013 3 SCR 657 (SCC). 
5  Jopek-Bosiacka 2011 Research in Language 9. 
6  Jopek-Bosiacka 2011 Research in Language 10, 14. 
7  Clark and Connolly 2006 https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-
programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf 2. 
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meaning is the ideal, the interpretation of legal texts causes frequent 
problems, as the meaning denoted in texts may not be the same for all 
addressees.8 In 1958 Hart9 encapsulated this issue perfectly by stating that 
in the most elementary form of law, the terms used should exist in some 
standard instance in which no doubt exists about their interpretation. Hart10 
is of the opinion that there should be a "core of settled meaning". 
In an attempt to provide clarity or guidance on some of the terms and 
concepts applicable to digital forensics and for the search and seizure of 
digital evidence, some of the concepts and terms are reviewed and 
discussed below.  
In the early 1900s Dr Edmond Locard developed one of the cornerstones of 
modern-day forensic science, the Locard's exchange principle.11 While 
studying medicine Locard developed an interest in the application of science 
to legal matters.12 Locard theorised that every time a person or an object 
comes into contact with another, this results in an exchange of physical 
materials. Locard believed that during this contact all sorts of evidence, 
including human deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), fingerprints, footprints, hair, 
skin cells, blood, bodily fluids, pieces of clothing, fibres and more are 
exchanged.13 As early as in 1997 Silvernail14 stated that when persons start 
to use a computer, evidence of activities is created. It is therefore 
recognised that the Locard principle also applies to computers15 due to the 
evidential traces or artefacts exchanged between the network of victims and 
the computers of perpetrators. This is confirmed by Wang,16 who 
emphasises the fact that digital evidence can prove crucial links between 
victims and perpetrators. 
If it is recognised that computers have become an attractive medium for 
criminals17 and that their activities on computers result in evidence that can 
                                            
8  Jopek-Bosiacka 2011 Research in Language 14. 
9  Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 607. 
10  Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 607. 
11  Forensics Library 2014 http://aboutforensics.co.uk/edmond-locard/. 
12  Forensic Handbook 2012 http://www.forensichandbook.com/locards-exchange-
principle/. 
13  Forensic Handbook 2012 http://www.forensichandbook.com/locards-exchange-
principle/. 
14  Silvernail 1997 Ala Law 176-177. 
15  Chisum and Turvey 2000 http://www.profiling.org/journal/vol1_no1/jbp_ed_january 
2000_1-1.html 11. 
16  Wang 2007 CSI 217. 
17  SALRC Issue Paper 27 7. 
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be linked to the crimes of suspects,18 it is essential to recognise the need 
for a discipline in the field of digital forensics.  
Digital evidence is often collected incorrectly and analysed ineffectively or 
simply overlooked due to the complexities that digital evidence poses to 
forensic investigators.19 This "new" type of evidence has prompted the 
beginning of a "new" type of forensic science − digital forensics.20 As with 
any forensic science, specific regulations, guidelines, principles or 
procedures should be followed to meet the objectives of investigations, 
namely the accuracy and acceptance of findings.21 These regulations, 
guidelines, principles or procedures are discussed in the context of digital 
forensics: what processes should be followed and how these processes 
ensure the acceptability of digital evidence.  
A summary is also provided of the most influential or best-recognised 
international standards on digital forensics. 
2 Terminology 
2.1 Sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Section 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 relates to the power of 
authorised officials to issue search and seizure warrants. 
The section furthermore authorises the police official to search and seize 
section 20 articles: 
 which are concerned; 
 which may afford evidence;  
 which are intended to be used in the commission of a crime.  
From this section, four concepts require further scrutiny on how these 
definitions relate to the digital environment, namely: 
 search; 
                                            
18  Casey Handbook of Computer Crime 1, 6. 
19  Casey Handbook of Computer Crime 8; Craiger and Shenoi Advances in Digital 
Forensics 49. 
20  Kerr 2005 Miss LJ 86. 
21  Vacca Computer Forensics 6. 
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 seize; 
 articles; 
 premises. 
The intrusive nature of search and seizure warrants and the obligation of 
the judicial system to guard against the misuse of this authority are well-
documented in the case of Powell v Van der Merwe.22 During this case, it 
was said that South African law has a long history of scrutinising search and 
seizure warrants with rigour and exactitude and that the common law rights 
are now enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. Because of the danger of misuse during the application of 
authority with regard to search and seizure warrants, the judiciary 
scrutinises the validity of warrants with jealous regard for the liberty of 
suspects and their rights. The scope of the terms is even more relevant in 
cases involving digital evidence due to the wide scope of personal and 
confidential information kept on the digital devices of persons.23 
The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of 
Europe suggests that additional procedural provisions are necessary in 
order to ensure that data can be secured in a manner as effective as in the 
case of the search and seizure of tangible objects.24 This is firstly because 
the data are intangible – they are in an electromagnetic medium. Secondly, 
while data can be read by making use of computer equipment, data cannot 
be taken away in the same sense as paper records.25 Kerr26 captures some 
of the complexities of digital evidence as follows: "How can the old rules fit 
the new facts? For example, what does it mean to 'search' computer data, 
or when is computer data 'seized'?" The Explanatory Report to the 
Convention on Cybercrime further suggests that data can be "seized" in only 
a specific number of ways, namely data can be printed and seized; the 
tangible medium upon which data is stored can be seized; or a forensic 
duplicate can be made of the data and the tangible form upon which the 
copy is saved can be seized. It is suggested that domestic law should 
provide for the power to create such duplicates.27 
                                            
22  Powell v Van der Merwe 2005 1 All SA 149 (SCA). 
23  Guzzi 2012 Am Crim L Rev 302. 
24  Council of Europe 2001 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_coe.pdf 32. 
25  Council of Europe 2001 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_coe.pdf 32. 
26  Kerr 2005 Harv L Rev 533. 
27  Council of Europe 2001 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_coe.pdf 32. 
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2.1.1 Defining the search for digital evidence 
Kerr28 suggests that forensic investigators should first search for and locate 
physical devices ("search one"). Then, forensic investigators should access 
and search these physical devices for relevant information or data ("search 
two"). For the purpose of this article, references to "search" are extended 
from Kerr's two-step process to include three phases, namely:  
 The traditional process in which forensic investigators search for or 
locate physical computers on a scene. 
 The forensic investigators search for or segregate relevant and non-
relevant information/data on these computers.  
 The analysis or interpretation of relevant information within the context 
of a larger investigation.  
This discussion of the definition of "search" relates to the later steps followed 
when data is searched, since it is acknowledged that the search for physical 
articles on premises is well-defined and understood in the law.  
The phenomenon of seizing’s taking place before a search has taken place 
is discussed by Brenner and Fredericksen,29 who state that a search and 
seizure of digital evidence turns a normal search and seizure on its head in 
the sense that computers are normally first seized and then searched. In 
the case of the Minister of Safety and Security v Bennett,30 it was recognised 
that in instances where large collections of physical documents are located 
on a scene, and when it is impractical to separate or effectively search these 
documents on the scene, a broad seizure of the collection of physical 
documents is permitted, pending a later search to segregate relevant and 
non-relevant information.  
The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime proposes that 
traditional words such as "search" and "seize" should be replaced with more 
technological-orientated computer terms, such as "access" and "copy".31 
This proposal is supported by Nieman,32 who is of the opinion that "search 
and seize" can more accurately described when computer terminology is 
used that is more neutral in meaning and can include actions, such as the 
                                            
28  Kerr 2005 Miss LJ 85. 
29  Brenner and Fredericksen 2002 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 82. 
30  Minister of Safety and Security v Bennett 2008 2 All SA 26 (SCA). 
31  Council of Europe 2001 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_coe.pdf 33. 
32  Nieman 2009 JILT 15. 
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creation of forensic duplicates of data. Currently, in the consultation draft of 
the proposed South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill dated 19 
June 2016 the term "access" is included and is defined as follows: "to make 
use of, to gain entry to, to view, display, instruct, or communicate with, to 
store data in or retrieve data from, to copy, move, add, change, or remove 
data or otherwise to make use of, configure or reconfigure any resources of 
a computer device".33 
In the Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba case34 it was stated that the 
concept of "search" should be given its ordinary meaning. The National 
Instruction 2/2002 of the South African Police Service (SAPS)35 states that 
"search" entails any action whereby a person, premise or container is 
visually or physically examined with the aim of establishing whether an item 
or article is in, on or upon such a person, premises or container. However, 
Basdeo36 is of the opinion that this approach is questionable since "visually" 
is not defined and can include merely looking at something. Furthermore, 
the question of what constitutes a search is left to common sense − 
accessed on a case-by-case basis. Basdeo continues and argues that an 
element of physical intrusion is required to constitute a search of persons, 
premises or properties.  
Merely observing a room does not constitute a fully-fledged search.37 Kerr38 
proposes that an "exposure-based approach" should be adopted and that 
data should be considered to have been "searched" only when the data 
were exposed to human observation.  
Basdeo39 states that the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
(2001) in Budapest (hereafter Budapest Convention) constitutes the current 
international agreed-upon benchmark for procedural powers in terms of 
digital evidence collection. The Budapest Convention proposes that 
"search" should include "to seek, read, inspect or review data", which 
includes the searching or examining of data.40 
The interpretation of "search" as an "exposure-based approach" is 
supported and based on any action in which forensic investigators access 
                                            
33  Draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 2016 6. 
34  Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 1 All SA 596 (D). 
35  SAPS National Instruction 2/2002 1. 
36  Basdeo Constitutional Perspective of Police Powers 21. 
37  Kerr 2005 Harv L Rev 536, 540. 
38  Kerr 2005 Harv L Rev 547. 
39  Basdeo 2012 SACJ 199. 
40  Council of Europe 2001 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_coe.pdf 33. 
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data by whatever means and take notice of information or observe 
information in a humanly readable format. It is recognised that the term 
"search" is extraordinarily broad, and a differentiation is made between the 
different contexts of search, as an action to firstly locate or look for devices 
on a scene; secondly, to locate and separate relevant and non-relevant 
data; and lastly, to analyse or interpret the data within the context of a larger 
investigation.  
2.1.2 Defining the seizure of digital evidence 
In the Rudolph v Commissioner for Inland Revenue case41 the court held 
that the term "seize" should be given its natural meaning. This ruling was 
supported in the case of Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security,42 when 
the court held that "seize" means not only to take possession of articles but 
also to retain them and, according to Steytler,43 to deprive persons of 
subsequent control over the articles. Nieman44 adds that a seizure takes 
place when persons are deprived of their control over articles, and without 
the subsequent right of retention of the articles section 21 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act would be worthless. In the Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and 
Security case, it was cautioned that the right of retention is not unlimited and 
does not authorise the State to deprive persons of their lawful possession 
of articles indefinitely.45 This is a very important issue raised by the court. 
Although sections 31 to 36 of the Criminal Procedure Act govern the 
disposal of articles under various conditions, no explicit reference is made 
to the duration in days for which articles may be retained after the point of 
seizure, or when forensic duplicates are made when the original articles are 
to be returned following the creation of the duplicates. The situation with 
computers differs from that of other classes of articles because computers 
and other digital devices such as cellular phones play such a large role in 
our everyday lives. The retention period under discussion does not refer to 
the retention of forensic duplicates of computers during an analysis phase, 
but to the period between the seizure of computers on a scene, the creation 
of off-site forensic duplicates, and the subsequent return of the original 
computers to the owners. In many countries, legislation stipulates a time 
period in a number of days for this retention period. In an unstructured 
interview,46 it was established that the practice in South Africa − due to there 
                                            
41  Rudolph v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1996 7 BCLR 11 (CC). 
42  Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 1 SA 257 (E). 
43  Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 84. 
44  Nieman 2009 JILT 16. 
45  Ntoyakhe v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 1 SA 257 (E). 
46  Anon Current Policy and Procedure. 
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being limited resources − is that police officials in the most cases seize 
computers on scenes and then transfer articles to central digital forensic 
laboratories. During this interview, it was stated that some of the digital 
forensic laboratories are months − even more than a year − behind in their 
workload.47 The interviewee48 estimated that on average persons are 
deprived of their computers (or cellular phones) for between five days to two 
years. 
In the light of the unique way in which digital evidence is normally collected 
or "seized", Kerr49 poses a number of questions with regard to the 
interpretation of when digital evidence is considered seized, namely: 
 Does the creation of forensic duplicates constitute a seizure? 
 Does the creation of forensic duplicates constitute a seizure of original 
evidence?  
 If forensic duplicates are searched, does this constitute a seizure? 
Kerr50 states that these aspects are surprisingly difficult to interpret and at 
first sight it seems sensible to say that the creation of forensic duplicates 
constitutes a seizure of evidence. In the United States case of Arizona v 
Hicks51 an investigator copied the serial number on a stereo system to 
establish later whether or not it was stolen goods. The court held that the 
copying of this information did not constitute a seizure. The court also held 
that the recording, copying or taking of a photograph of information on a 
scene does not constitute a seizure. This finding highlights the question 
whether forensic duplicates of computers constitute a seizure. Kerr52 further 
reviewed these complexities by arguing that if the creation of forensic 
duplicates is not recognised as constituting a search and seizure − since 
the data were not exposed, read or observed by humans, but only 
forensically duplicated – this could drastically expand the powers of the 
forensic investigators. In addition, Kerr maintains that should the making of 
forensic duplicates not be viewed as a search and seizure, the forensic 
investigators would not need search and seizure warrants, and Kerr refers 
to such a situation as "troublesome" and downright "creepy".  
                                            
47  Anon Current Policy and Procedure. 
48  Anon Current Policy and Procedure. 
49  Kerr 2005 Harv L Rev 541. 
50  Kerr 2005 Harv L Rev 557. 
51  Arizona v Hicks 480 US 321, 325 (1987). 
52  Kerr 2005 Harv L Rev 560. 
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The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime53 proposes that 
"seize" should also include "to take away the physical medium which stores 
the data" or to make and retain forensic duplicates of data. This proposal is 
supported by Basdeo,54 who is of the opinion that the seizure of data 
includes not only the confiscation of data but also the "gathering" of data.  
The concept of seizure is important, and it is therefore necessary to consider 
the way in which and the reason why forensic duplicates are created. 
Nieman55 explains that forensic duplicates do exactly what the name 
suggests − bit-by-bit exact duplicates of every sector of a hard drive are 
created. The requirement of section 14 of the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 relating to the originality of evidence 
stipulates that where the law requires information to be presented or 
retained in its original form, that requirement is met if the integrity of the 
digital evidence from the time it was first generated to its final form has 
passed assessment. Vacca56 states that a new concept of representational 
accuracy has emerged in terms of digital evidence − it is not necessary 
anymore to present the original. If forensic duplicates are created that depict 
the source data exactly, these duplicates can be considered originals. 
However, after forensic duplicates of computers are created and the 
originals are handed back to suspects, as soon as a person switches on the 
computer the content of that computer changes on a continual basis.57 
The proposed Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill provides a more inclusive 
definition for "seize" by including the rendering of data inaccessible, the 
removal of physical devices, to make or retain forensic duplicates, or to 
make a printout of data.58 For the purposes of this article, the interpretation 
of "seizure" includes the creation of forensically-sound duplicate originals, 
and the seizure or retention of these duplicates is viewed by the State as 
originals.  
Defining premises and containers 
Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act defines "premises" as "including 
land, any building or structure, or any vehicle, conveyance, ship, boat or 
aircraft". It is questioned whether this definition permits the inclusion of a 
computer as a premises and does this definition permit the search of 
                                            
53  Council of Europe 2001 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_pry_coe.pdf 33. 
54  Basdeo 2012 SACJ 199. 
55  Nieman 2009 JILT 22. 
56  Vacca Computer Forensics 237. 
57  Vacca Computer Forensics 19. 
58  Draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 2016 9. 
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computers prior to seizure? In their Discussion Paper on Computer-related 
Crime59 the SALRC is of view that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Act were developed prior to the notion that non-physical premises or non-
tangible articles exist, and the commission is of the opinion that chapter two 
of the Criminal Procedure Act most probably does not apply to the search 
of computers and the seizure of data located on computers. They 
recommend that the Criminal Procedure Act be amended to specifically 
include the search of computers and the seizure of data. Section 82(4) of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act stipulates, "For the 
purposes of this Act, any reference in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, to 
'premises' and 'article' includes an information system as well as a data 
message". Unfortunately, the new Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill is 
silent in this regard and does not provide a wider, more inclusive definition, 
but recognises the searching of containers.60 This definition is also 
supported by the National Instruction 2/2002 of the SAPS, where it states 
that a search entails any action whereby persons, premises or containers 
are visually or physically examined with the aim of establishing whether 
items or articles are in, on or upon such persons, premises or containers.61 
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court in the case of the United States v Flores-
Lopez62 defined containers as any objects containing anything else − 
including data. The court held that smartphones or tablets comply with this 
definition and can therefore be searched.  
The court held in the Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions case63 that 
it is a requirement in a South African environment that "premises" should be 
clearly defined. The question is then raised that if off-site searches of 
computers are permitted, what premises should be specified in warrants? 
Traditionally, premises are where suspects are located, but the presence of 
computers turns the search and seizure process around: the seizure of 
computers takes place on a scene but the search of data takes place at the 
premises of forensic investigators. Should the premises of suspects be 
listed, or the premises of forensic investigators or should computers be 
listed as premises? The answer was provided by the court during the 
                                            
59  SALRC Discussion Paper 9 14. 
60  Draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 2016 27. 
61  SAPS National Instruction 2/2002 1. 
62  United States v Flores-Lopez No 10-3803 (7th Cir 2012). 
63  Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions, Zuma v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions 2009 1 SA 1 (CC). 
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Minister of Safety and Security v Bennett case,64 where the seizing of 
physical documents − prior to the search of these documents off-site − was 
permitted without a description of the secondary premises of the forensic 
investigators. In the unreported judgement of Bennett v Minister of Safety 
and Security,65 the court also expressed the opinion that it is irrelevant 
where forensic duplicates are created after the seizure and removal from 
the scene. 
Another issue is raised in this regard − if forensic investigators are planning 
to seize data on another network or at an online location, do the search and 
seizure warrants need to state the physical location from which the forensic 
investigators are accessing the data or the physical location of where the 
data are kept?66 At the time when Kerr studied these aspects in 2005, cloud 
hosting was not as prevalent as it is today. If forensic investigators need to 
seize the files of persons kept in a virtual environment − hosted in a cloud − 
what premises need to be described? Search and seizure is further 
complicated by the structure of cloud hosting, where one document can be 
broken up into a number of segments and each segment can be stored on 
a different server in a different country. The implications of this issue on 
search and seizure are recognised by the Australian Crimes Act67 and the 
New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act,68 both of which permit law 
enforcement to search remote locations, such as online data storage 
facilities with no physical addresses or specific singular location, such as 
cloud services, or where the physical locations are unknown. 
For the purpose of this article, the interpretation of "premises" is limited to 
the traditional description of premises or locations and not extended to 
describing devices as separate premises or the premises of digital forensic 
investigators.  
Defining articles or items 
Bouwer69 observes that the Criminal Procedure Act is lacking in that it does 
not specifically include data as articles, and stated that the legislature has 
recognised this omission by referencing the definition of articles and 
premises in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, which 
                                            
64  Minister of Safety and Security v Bennett 2008 2 All SA 26 (SCA). 
65  Bennett v Minister of Safety and Security (TPD) (unreported) case number 
10828/2005 of 13 May 2005 11. 
66  Kerr 2005 Miss LJ 104. 
67  Section 3LB of the Australian Crimes Act 12 of 1914. 
68  Section 111 of the Search and Surveillance Act 24 of 2012. 
69  Bouwer 2014 SACJ 171. 
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states that data messages are classified as articles if these messages relate 
to a section 20 article as defined by the Criminal Procedure Act. Basdeo70 
states that “data” refers to information that has been transformed into digital 
form and in terms of the provisions made in section 20 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, which stipulates that anything can be seized and that 
anything should be susceptible to a wide enough interpretation to include 
data. Notwithstanding, Basdeo further advises that the provisions made in 
the Criminal Procedure Act should be restructured to alleviate the restrictive 
interpretation that “articles” are only physical items. Basdeo further 
expresses the opinion that law enforcement is currently interpreting 
“articles” very widely, and applies this definition to the seizure of digital 
evidence − a practice that has not yet been contested in court. This aspect 
is addressed in the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, which defines an 
"article" as any data, computer devices, computer networks, databases, 
critical databases, electronic communication networks or national critical 
information infrastructures or any part thereof or any other information, 
instruments, devices or equipment.71 
For the purpose of this paper, the interpretation of "articles" or "items" as 
per the proposed Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill is supported to include 
data, data storage devices and data processing devices.  
2.3 Defining data and data messages 
Article 1(b) of the Budapest Convention defines computer data as any 
representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for being 
processed on computers. The SALRC states that the definition provided by 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of "data" and "data 
messages" is based on Article 2 of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
with Guide to Enactment,72 which uses "data" and "data message" instead 
of the terms "electronic evidence" or "digital evidence".73 This approach is 
also recommended by the Practical Guide of the SAPS,74 which uses the 
term "data" instead of "digital evidence". The accurate use of terminology in 
search and seizure warrants in line with enabling legislation is supported in 
the case of Heaney v S,75 where the ruling was that the description of a 
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suspected crime should be accurately described in line with the enabling 
legislation, and colloquially used terms should not be applied. The 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act describes "data" as the 
electronic representation of information in any form, and "data messages" 
as data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means. The 
SALRC further explains that in Part 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce (1996) it is stated that the concept of data messages 
is not intended to be limited to communication, but should include computer 
records and all types of messages that are generated, stored or 
communicated in a paperless form.76 
For the purpose of this article, the definition of "data" is adapted from section 
1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act as is “the digital 
representation of information in any form”, and not the "electronic 
representation of data in any form". 
2.4 Digital, computer, electronic or cyber evidence 
The SALRC observes that Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce refers to "data" and "data messages" rather than to 
"electronic evidence" or "digital evidence".77 The reason for this is obvious, 
since the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, which forms the basis of the 
South African Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, is aimed at 
regulating e-commerce, and only a small portion of it relates to defining 
criminal activities. The Model Law on Electronic Commerce stipulates that 
the law applies to all commercial activities.78 It is therefore logical rather to 
use descriptions such as "data" or "data messages". Data or data messages 
become relevant during investigations into criminal activities, when 
"electronic evidence" or "digital evidence" should be used. Bouwer79 
recommends that a single definition for "electronic evidence" should be 
adopted in the South African law as "information of probative value stored 
or transmitted in digital format". 
References to "computer" evidence or "computer" crime seem to be out-
dated.80 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act make reference to data, data 
messages and information systems instead of "computer". The word 
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"computer" is well understood and is derived from what devices do, namely 
computing.81 Computers are defined as "electronic devices which are 
capable of receiving information (data) in a particular form and of performing 
a sequence of operations in accordance with a predetermined but variable 
set of procedural instructions (a programme) to produce a result in the form 
of information or signals".82 This definition differs vastly from any description 
of cellular phones with computing capabilities, which are described by the 
Oxford Dictionary as primarily telephones connected via cellular networks 
over a wide area.83 
The term "cyber" is also of importance. In 1984 William Gibson originally 
coined the term "cyberspace" in his science fiction novel Neuromancer.84 
The Oxford Dictionary defines "cyber" as "relating to or characteristic of the 
culture of computers, information technology, and virtual reality."85  
It is very difficult to differentiate between "electronic" and "digital". The 
SALRC shed light on this dilemma.86 The commission states that while 
these two terms are used interchangeably, an important distinction exists 
between the two − analogue and digital outputs. Examples of analogue 
outputs are vinyl records, photographic films and old telephone systems 
making use of switchboards.87 Neither the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act nor the Model Law on Electronic Commerce provides any 
description or definition of "electronic". Spencer88 states that the term 
"electronic" is not particularly technical and has become synonymous with 
consumer electronics, such as clocks, radios, smartphones and tablets. It is 
therefore obvious that although "electronic devices" should include "data", 
the term is not exclusively limited to "data". However, "digital" is based on 
binary coding and functions as the building blocks of data.89 The Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence (hereafter SWGDE) supports this by 
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defining "digital evidence" as evidence stored or transmitted in a binary 
form.90 
For the purpose of this article, the term "digital" is used as opposed to the 
terms "electronic", "cyber" or "computer". 
2.5 Forensic duplicating processes in relation to originality  
Digital forensic investigations often involve creating and examining forensic 
duplicates of the data under analysis.91 Forensic investigators use forensic 
duplication techniques to collect or acquire data from hard drives, as 
opposed to the normal copying of files. This is because forensic duplicates 
contain all of the data from the source drive − even deleted files.92 A normal 
copying process retrieves only the active or currently accessible files, not 
deleted files as well.93 A number of references were found to the concept of 
creating forensic duplicates of digital evidence, including copies, clones, bit-
stream copies, images, forensic copies, bit-by-bit copies, mirror images and 
acquisitions. Vandeven94 provides the following definitions for some of 
these concepts: 
 Bit-by-bit or bit-stream copies − exact copies of all the bits of a logical 
volume or a physical drive. If the copies are made to files, it is referred 
to as forensic image files. If copies are made to another disk, it is 
referred to as clones or mirror images. The original and clones are 
identical and interchangeable, but if clones are not write-protected, 
subsequent actions of an analysis can alter the data. 
 Disk image files − files containing exact copies of logical volumes or 
physical disks. 
 Forensic images − exact copies of all the bits of logical volumes or 
physical drives that have been copied bit-by-bit and include all data 
and metadata. Forensic images include information, such as when 
these images were copied, by whom, with which forensic tools and the 
cryptographic hash used for verification of these images.  
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 Raw images − exact bit-by-bit copies of disks into a single file. Raw 
images do not contain information regarding the creation of these 
images.  
According to Gerber,95 forensic duplicates were previously also referred to 
as "mirror" images, but because the term confused courts, the use of 
"mirror" images is not recommended. Normally, mirror images are reverse 
images of originals.  
All of these different terms can be confusing, but nowhere was it found in 
research that any of the terms used − except for "mirror copies" – has been 
rejected by courts.  
In the light of the above, a single expression could prove to be technically 
incorrect in all situations. Whatever terminology is used, Lidbury and 
Boland96 state that what makes "collections" forensically sound should be 
the main aim − whether data were collected is an exact duplicate of the 
original source, including metadata. This implies that the collection method 
and subsequent analysis steps should not alter data and should include 
mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the data, such as the extraction of 
hash values. The judicial measures within a South African environment are 
the requirements specified by section 14 of the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act − the originality of data messages is measured against 
the integrity of digital evidence from the time the data were first generated. 
Integrity is assessed by considering whether the evidence has remained 
complete and unaltered except for the adding of endorsements or changes 
which are caused in the normal course of communication. Vacca97 states 
that an important feature of digital forensics is the fact that it changes the 
legal concept of best evidence. Vacca states that a new concept of 
representational accuracy has emerged in terms of digital evidence. It is not 
necessary anymore to present original copies. If forensic duplicates are 
created and the source data are depicted exactly, duplicates are considered 
original.98 
In the Canadian case of R v Munshi,99 it was stated that with the 
modernisation of technology, forensic duplication processes have 
developed to such an extent that duplicate originals can exist. Although this 
                                            
95  Cited in Kessler Judges' Awareness 37. 
96  Lidbury and Boland 2012 http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/05/11/technology-
forensically-sound-collection-of-esi 1. 
97  Vacca Computer Forensics 795. 
98  Vacca Computer Forensics 237. 
99  R v Munshi 2002 CanLII 39110 (ON SC). 
JGJ NORTJÉ & DC MYBURGH  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  18 
ruling related to documents, the court stated that where exact replication 
processes are used, it is generally not necessary to compare original 
documents with the duplicate originals.  
Van Deusen Phillips100 maintains that the test of establishing whether or not 
digital documents can stand as evidence is to determine or prove that the 
content of the documents is indeed the original, unchanged content. Van 
Deusen Phillips further states that this is normally accomplished by 
presenting the original documents or the duplicate originals. In the American 
case of Lorraine v Markel American Ins Co,101 the court held that an original 
is the writing itself or a counterpart intended to have the same effect, and 
that if data are stored on computers or on similar devices, any printouts or 
other outputs readable by sight reflect the data accurately, the data can be 
accepted as original. In the case of Muller v BOE Bank Ltd,102 it was 
acknowledged that South African courts have accepted and are 
accustomed to the creation or existence of "copies" recognised as duplicate 
originals since the inception of carbon copies.  
For the purpose of this article, the most elucidating description, which 
should make room for interpretation, is the creation of "forensically-sound 
duplicate original records" (hereafter forensic duplicates). 
3 Digital forensics and international standards 
3.1 Digital forensics 
Many definitions of digital forensics exist. Palmer103 captures the main 
aspects as the use of scientifically-derived and proven methods in locating, 
collecting, preserving, analysing, interpreting, documenting and presenting 
digital evidence relating to incidents, often with the aim of presenting 
evidence during hearings. The goal of the process is to preserve evidence 
in its most original form while performing a structured analysis by collecting, 
identifying and validating digital information for the purpose of 
reconstructing past events.  
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As a scientific-based discipline, digital forensics is premised on following set 
standards or methodologies in the processes defined above, which are 
susceptible to inspection by judiciaries.104 
3.2 International standards 
Nieman105 states that it is ironic that digital forensics first and foremost 
concerns forensic procedure, rules of evidence, legal concepts, precedents 
and processes and, second to this, computers. It is exactly because of this 
that standards in this field play such an important role.  
Most of the "standards" are presented as guidelines as opposed to set 
standards.106 
In the light of the importance of standards or the important role that 
standards should play in digital forensics as a science, it is surprising that 
there are no set standards, rules or a protocol for the handling of digital 
evidence, and that technical processes applied to digital evidence "do not 
have to pass any formal test" for digital evidence to be placed before 
courts.107 It is therefore understandable that the digital forensic industry has 
largely been self-regulated within a framework of internationally advised 
practices, case law, guidelines and industry groups.  
3.2.1 Principles of the Association of Chief of Police Officers 
The Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence108 of the 
ACPO was drafted in 1997. According to Mohay et al.,109 these principles 
were reviewed during an International Hi-Tech Crime and Forensic 
Conference in October 1999 and were further formalised and accepted in 
2001 at the 13th International Criminal Organisation's (Interpol) Forensic 
Science Symposium. 
Digital evidence should be accurate, authentic and admissible, like any 
other evidence, and should conform to common law and legislative 
principles.110 If investigators, for example, open files and make copies, 
move, save or print these files, these actions are not viewed as neutral, and 
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may influence or modify evidence.111 The Explanatory Report to the 
Cybercrime Convention indicates that digital evidence should be retained in 
the state it was found from the start to the point of prosecution.112 Kessler113 
highlights the fact that each stage should be performed in such a way that 
the integrity of the evidence is preserved. 
The ACPO principles have long been a guideline for digital forensic 
investigators in formulating digital forensic procedures to ensure that the 
requirements as listed above are met when evidence is collected, handled 
and managed. The guide contains the following four principles concerning 
the collection and management of digital evidence:114 
 Principle 1: No actions taken by investigators should change the data 
that may subsequently be relied upon in court. 
 Principle 2: Only in exceptional situations should investigators work 
with or access the original data and only if they are competent to do 
so and in a position to provide evidence explaining the relevance and 
the implications of their actions. 
 Principle 3: All processes applied to the digital evidence by 
investigators should be fully recorded to enable independent third 
party experts to follow these processes and reach the same results. 
 Principle 4: Investigators should ensure that all legal principles are 
adhered to during the analysis of digital evidence.  
The principles provide guidelines so that the actions of investigators do not 
change the digital evidence under investigation, and if original evidence is 
accessed, this should be done by competent persons. A complete audit trail 
should be maintained so that the actions of investigators can be reviewed, 
assessed and evaluated against local legal requirements. These 
international principles were drafted with the aim of ensuring that the 
handling of digital evidence conforms to the requirements of evidence in 
terms of the law and especially to ensure that the integrity of evidence is 
maintained by ensuring that data have remained unaltered.115 The 
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SALRC116 affirmed the importance of these principles when the commission 
stated that by accessing files, the actions of forensic investigators are not 
neutral and it is not easy to prove the integrity of digital evidence given the 
volatile nature of digital evidence. It has also been stated that the incorrect 
following of crime scene protocols and proper procedures can render digital 
evidence unusable or vulnerable to claims of prejudicial distortion by the 
defence.  
3.2.2 Standards and guidelines of the International Organisation of 
Standardisation 
3.2.2.1 ISO 27037 − Security Techniques − Guidelines for identification, 
collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence 
In October 2012 the ISO 27037 Standard on Information Technology − 
Security Techniques − guidelines for the identification, collection, 
acquisition and preservation of digital evidence was approved and 
published. The ISO standards are very well known, but even the ISO 
standards seem to shy away from setting rigid standards in a digital forensic 
environment. In the opening line of the scope of the ISO/IEC DIS 27037 
Standard,117 it is stated that it merely provides "guidelines for specific 
activities in handling potential digital evidence; these processes are: 
identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of potential digital 
evidence".  
The processes specified in the standard set guidelines to ensure that digital 
forensic investigators maintain the integrity of digital evidence during the 
collection phases of investigations by following analysis methodologies 
aimed at advancing the admissibility of evidence during legal processes. 
The importance of the integrity of evidence is supported by Kanellis,118 who 
emphasises that evidence should be managed correctly so that it cannot 
lose value and as a result, be inadmissible in courts. The ISO/IEC DIS 
27037 Standard sets out four fundamental principles for procedures to be 
followed in collecting digital evidence.119 Digital forensic investigators 
should:  
 Minimise the handling of original evidence. 
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 Document all actions taken and account for any alterations in the data 
to allow experts to express an opinion regarding the reliability of the 
data. 
 Adhere to local rules of evidence. 
 Not take any actions beyond their competence. 
The ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard specifies that, in most jurisdictions, digital 
evidence is governed by three primary principles:120 
 Relevance 
A standard requirement is that only relevant data should be collected. 
In other words, the data collected should assist in examining incidents 
or aspects of incidents at hand and there should be a need and a 
reason to collect the data. This requirement is supported by sections 
28, 31 and 210 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which regulate wrongful 
searches and seizures, the inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence and 
the return of articles not required for criminal proceedings. Digital 
forensic investigators should be in a position to explain the procedures 
followed and validate the reasons and grounds why specific data were 
collected. Francoeur121 explains that any evidence should have an 
adequate level of relevance to the matter investigated. 
 Reliability 
All processes followed in handling digital evidence should be auditable 
and repeatable. The result of applying these processes should be 
reproducible by independent parties when they follow the same 
process. Hofman122 highlights that digital evidence should satisfy 
ordinary requirements related to the admissibility of documents. 
Documents should be authentic, reliable and original. 
 Sufficiency 
Digital forensic investigators should ensure that all relevant 
information is collected to ensure that the matter at hand can be 
sufficiently analysed and considered. Digital forensic investigators 
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should be able to provide an indication of how much data was 
considered and should be able to justify the decision about what data 
and how much data to acquire.  
The ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard specifies that all processes in relation to 
digital forensic investigations should be:123 
 Auditable 
All processes, procedures and results should be auditable by 
independent forensic investigators to evaluate the activities performed 
by digital forensic investigators. Audits can be facilitated if the 
processes and actions followed by digital forensic investigators are 
sufficiently documented. Digital forensic investigators should be able 
to explain the basis upon which decisions were taken and the choice 
of methodology followed during analyses.  
 Repeatability 
Repeatability is established when the same results are obtained in the 
following situations:  
o when the same procedures and methods are used; 
o when the same equipment under the same conditions is used. 
It should be noted that repeatability is not possible in all situations - for 
example, where live data was analysed, or volatile memory. In this 
case, digital forensic investigators should ensure that acquisition 
processes are reliable.  
 Reproducibility  
Reproducibility is established when the same test results are produced 
under the following conditions:  
o when the same method is used; 
o when different equipment is used under different conditions; 
o when the same results can be reproduced at any time after the 
original test. 
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 Justifiability 
Digital forensic investigators should be able to validate all actions and 
methods used in identifying, collecting, analysing and managing 
potential digital evidence. Justification can be achieved by 
demonstrating that their decisions were best practice in a specific case 
in obtaining all of the potential digital evidence in existing 
circumstances. 
In terms of handling digital evidence, the ISO/IEC DIS 27037 Standard 
advises that "devices that may contain potential digital evidence [should be] 
removed from their original location to a laboratory or another controlled 
environment for later acquisition and analysis" and that forensic duplicates 
should be made for analyses to take place.124 
The standard sets out a number of phases during digital forensic 
investigations,125 which directly relate to searches and seizures, namely: 
 Identification – which includes the search for data storage devices, the 
recognition thereof and the documentation of processes followed. It 
also entails the prioritisation of the sequence of methods used to 
secure digital evidence, which can be volatile. 
 Collection – which relates to the collection and removal of evidence or 
the acquisition of evidence on a scene. 
 Acquisition – which entails the creation of forensically sound 
duplicates of evidence in the least restrictive manner possible. 
 Preserving evidence − from the point of collection throughout all of the 
digital forensic processes followed. 
These phases are described during the process of digital seizures and 
divided into two distinctly different stages, namely the search of physical 
devices on a scene and later searches for relevant data.126 To ensure that 
evidence is not compromised, forensic duplicates are created of originals, 
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and it is the forensic duplicates that are analysed.127 The process followed 
in creating forensic duplicates should ultimately stand up to legal scrutiny.128 
The collection of digital evidence is a forensic and procedural process which 
should always be performed with care.129 Data should be collected in such 
a way that the information is retained in the exact state in which it was 
found.130 
Cross131 explains that "acquisition" refers to the process of collecting digital 
evidence from specific devices, normally the computers of suspects or 
victims.  
The process of creating forensic duplicates usually commences by 
removing the hard drive from the computer of the victim or suspect and by 
connecting the hard drive to a write-protector device.132 This procedure is in 
line with the principles set out by the ACPO133 and the IOS134 − the actions 
of investigators should not change data and, where possible, forensic 
duplicates should be made of the relevant data and these forensic 
duplicates should be analysed.  
A write-protector device places a computer in a read-only form.135 This 
device prevents actions taken by investigators, such as opening and closing 
files or searching through files from influencing or changing metadata. This 
device allows digital forensic investigators to conduct preliminary searches 
on computers to establish whether these computers contain relevant 
information or not.  
At this stage, evidence can be browsed to determine whether it contains 
relevant evidence or whether imaging can be started without browsing the 
evidence. Once it is determined that devices contain relevant evidence, 
forensic duplicates of the evidence should be made. This is done by means 
of a number of forensic software programs which allow digital forensic 
investigators to create forensic duplicates of devices. Nieman136 explains 
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that bit-by-bit copies do exactly what the name suggests – copies are 
created bit-by-bit. A bit is the smallest size that data can be broken up into, 
an exact replica of every sector of a hard drive. Bit-by-bit copies are exact 
reproductions of digital records that contain all of the data, even hidden or 
deleted data.137 Forensic duplicates and original pieces of evidence are 
exact copies of one another based and proven on scientific principles, and 
they can therefore be considered as duplicate originals.138 With the current 
technology available, digital forensic investigators are able to collect a single 
file from a computer or a whole folder or the whole hard drive, including 
empty or unallocated space.139 To create forensic duplicates can be a 
lengthy process. According to the Digital Intelligence,140 an average transfer 
rate to create forensic duplicates is approximately 6GB per minute. If a hard 
drive is 500GB in size, it therefore takes 83 minutes to create one forensic 
duplicate and another 83 minutes to verify the integrity of a forensic 
duplicate. Creating forensic duplicates of a server can easily take more than 
12 to 24 hours.  
During collection processes, forensic programmes use a cryptographic 
hashing algorithm to ascertain the hash value of data. This is referred to as 
the MD5 hash algorithm or SHA1 hash algorithm. Nieman141 correctly states 
that this hash value is often referred to as the electronic fingerprint of a piece 
of data. 
The MD5 hash algorithm is a 128 bit hash value, while the SHA1 algorithm 
is a 160 bit hash value and the SHA1 hash is considered to be a more 
complex and more secure algorithm.142 Schneier143 explains that the MD5 
hash value has a key size of 128 bits with 3.4 × 1038 possible combinations. 
The chance of randomly finding two files that produce the same hash value 
should be computationally unfeasible. Digital forensic investigators can 
therefore mathematically − beyond a reasonable doubt − show in court that 
digital evidence has not changed by even one character.  
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considerations-for-electronic-evidence-part-5-original-vs-duplicate-documents-unfair-
prejudice/. 
139  Vandeven 2014 https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic-
images-viewing-pleasure-35447 1. 
140  Digital Intelligence 2016 https://www.digitalintelligence.com/products/ 
forensic_duplicator/. 
141  Nieman 2009 JILT 22. 
142  Thompson 2005 Digital Investigation 39. 
143  Schneier Applied Cryptography 436-441. 
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An example of hash values for the word "CAT" is: 
MD5 hash value – c01ae1a5f122f25ce5675f86028b536a 
SHA1 hash value – cf9b775c2c444520178d30c267440066c6eff6e8  
Losey144 explains that if one single character in a computer is changed, the 
hash value changes. If the word "CAT" is changed, for example, to "CATS", 
the hash values change to:  
MD5 hash value – ee77f71f2b809c0f6d92320fc9b480f6 
SHA1 hash value – c7da99899675795b2f1d94607dbe57b731dd2255 
Brown145 states that an imaging process is a scientific process and subject 
to the Daubert reliability test,146 which was formulated in Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.147 This scientific requirement is further 
discussed in the ISO/IEC DIS 27043 Standard below. 
3.2.2.2 ISO/IEC 27043 Standard on Information Technology − Security 
techniques − Incident investigation principles and processes 
The American Academy of Forensic Sciences identified digital forensics as 
a forensic science.148 As it is a scientific discipline, evidence prepared 
through digital forensics should meet the same standards as other scientific 
and technical evidence to be admissible in court.149 The final draft of the 
ISO/IEC 27043 Standard on information technology − Security techniques 
− Incident investigation principles and processes150 - specify that persons 
can be considered experts based on their experience, knowledge, skill, 
training or education. The opinions, theories, processes, procedures and 
tools used by experts should be evaluated against the Daubert test,151 which 
has for long been the de facto test in the United States of America and is 
applied by courts to scientific procedures used to prepare or uncover 
                                            
144  Losey 2007 https://e-discoveryteam.com/school/computer-hash-5f0266c4c326 
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145  Brown Computer Evidence 28. 
146  Kessler Judges' Awareness 4. 
147  Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579 (1993). 
148  AAFS 2008 http://www.aafs.org/students/choosing-a-career/types-of-forensic-
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149  Kessler Judges' Awareness 20. 
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151  Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579 (1993). 
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evidence. The Daubert test comprises the following factors that should be 
taken into account to ensure the integrity of evidence:152 
 The theories and techniques used by experts should have been 
tested. 
 The theories and techniques should have been subjected to peer 
review and should appear in publications. 
 Any error rates should be known to the experts and have been 
reported. 
 Experts should be governed by standards governing their applications. 
 The theories and techniques used by experts should enjoy widespread 
acceptance. 
The ISO/IEC 27043 Standard expanded and sets out the different phases 
of a digital investigation. It is divided into two main areas, namely digital 
investigation processes and the concurrent or parallel processes depicted 
below.153 
                                            
152  Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579 (1993). 
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Figure 1 – Digital forensic processes154 
 
A summary of the different phases of a forensic investigation,155 as depicted 
in Figure 1, includes: 
                                            
154  IOS 2014 https://www.iso.org/standard/44407.html 14. 
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 Detection phase – incidents are detected.  
 First responder phase − digital forensic investigators attend to 
incidents. 
 Planning phase − investigations of incidents are planned. 
 Preparation phase and scene documentation phase − preparation 
steps are taken to investigate incidents and document actions are 
taken on scenes. 
 Evidence identification phase − potentially relevant evidence is 
identified. 
 Evidence collection phase − evidence is collected. 
 Evidence transportation phase − evidence is transported from scenes 
to digital forensic laboratories. 
 Evidence storage phase − digital evidence is securely stored. 
 Evidence analysis phase − evidence is analysed to determine its 
relevance. 
 Evidence interpretation phase − evidence is interpreted in relation to 
its evidential value. 
 Reporting phase − evidence is reported on. 
 Presentation phase − testimonies or overviews are provided regarding 
the evidence. 
 Closure phase – cases are archived. 
The parallel processes include: 
 Obtaining of authorisation to investigate incidents. 
 Documentation of all actions during investigations. 
 Continual information flow between digital forensic investigators and 
forensic investigators. 
                                            
155  IOS 2014 https://www.iso.org/standard/44407.html 14-21. 
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 Maintaining chain-of-custody. 
 Preserving the integrity of evidence. 
 Interaction with physical investigations. 
Three of the parallel processes set out by the standard are of paramount 
importance:  
Obtaining authorisation  
Proper authorisation should be obtained for each process performed during 
an investigation. Authorisation may be required from government 
authorities, system owners, system custodians and principals. For the 
purpose of this article, proper authorisation is achieved through the 
application for search and seizure warrants in terms of the provisions 
stipulated in sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
Preserving the chain of custody  
A traditional requirement for proving the integrity of evidence is the chain of 
custody. Van der Merwe et al.156 state that the prosecution needs to 
convince the court that the evidence was not interfered with from the time it 
was seized to the presentation in court. It is therefore critical that forensic 
investigators should ensure that digital evidence remains secure throughout 
the analysis.157 
The chain of custody requirements were expanded upon in the ISO/IEC DIS 
27037 Standard. These requirements relate to the ability of digital forensic 
investigators to account for all the acquired evidence from the point when it 
was within their custody.158 A chain of custody can be viewed as a record 
that chronologically captures the movements and handling of evidence. A 
chain of custody should contain: 
 a unique identifier; 
 a record of who accessed the evidence at what time and place; 
 a record of who checked the evidence in or out of storage and for what 
reason or under whose authority; 
                                            
156  Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 85. 
157  Cross Scene of the Cybercrime 211. 
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 a record of any unavoidable changes made to the evidence, who made 
the changes and a justification for introducing the evidence to court.  
Schetina, Green and Carlson,159 together with Lange and Nimsger,160 state 
the importance of a chain of custody in relation to the admissibility of digital 
evidence and say that courts need to be informed concerning the measures 
that were adhered to. A chain of custody ensures that evidence was not 
tampered with. Standard digital forensic processes − if followed and 
executed correctly − support and contribute to the chain of custody 
requirements. 
5 Conclusions  
It is evident that the uniqueness of digital evidence poses complications to 
traditional legal approaches. Digital evidence encompasses both tangible 
devices and intangible data and requires special methodologies to identify 
and collect all relevant evidence. The seizure of all data on computers can 
be viewed as a too extensive action due to the fact that not all of the relevant 
information is contained in files. It can reside in different locations on 
computers. The technical nature of cybercrimes and subsequent technical 
expert testimony adds further dynamics that are faced by digital forensic 
investigators. 
The technical analysis and interpretation of terminology in relation to digital 
evidence are aspects that will be debated at length in South African courts 
in years to come. These interpretations can be problematic in terms of data, 
but a sound understanding can be gained from case law with regard to 
technical issues. It is argued that the "premises" described in search and 
seizure warrants should be the premises of suspects, and the interpretation 
of "search" should include actions in which the content of data becomes 
exposed. It is proposed that "search actions" such as look, locate, separate 
the information, interpret and analyse should be recognised. The creation 
of forensically-sound duplicate original records should constitute the seizure 
of data as items or articles of digital information in any form and should be 
recognised as original duplicates. 
The originality, reliability, integrity and admissibility of digital evidence 
should be maintained as follows: 
                                            
159  Schetina, Green and Carlson Internet Site Security 351. 
160  Lange and Nimsger Electronic Evidence 76. 
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 Data should not be changed or altered. 
 Original evidence should not be directly examined. 
 Forensically sound duplicates should be created. 
 Digital forensic analyses should be performed by competent persons. 
 Digital forensic analyses should adhere to relevant local legal 
requirements. 
 Audit trails should exist consisting of all required documents. 
 Chains of custody should be protected. 
 Processes and procedures should be proper while recognised and 
accepted by the industry.  
If the ACPO (1997) principles and ISO/IEC 27043 and 27037 Standards are 
followed as a forensic framework, then the actions of digital forensic 
investigators should be legally acceptable. 
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